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Abstract
Theories of protection powerful enough to resolve security
questions of computer systems are considered.
Mo single theory
of protection is adequate for proving whether the security
afforded by an arbitrary protection system suffices to safeguard
data from unauthorized access. When theories of protection are
restricted' to computer systems which are bounded in size,
adequate theories exist, but they are inherently intractable.
The implications of these results are discussed.
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1.

In trod uct ion
No existing computer

withstood penetration.

system is completely secure.

None can truthfully claim

None has

complete

protection of files and other confidential user objects.
computers are, in fact, easily compromised.

Have

designers

somehow paid insufficient attention to security policies
mechanisms?

Most

and

Or is it inherently difficult to determine whether a

given security

policy and mechanism is safe, that is, whether

can provide a proper degree of safety

for user

it

objects?

V'e consider the prospects for developing a comprehensive
theory of protection
sufficiently

(or even a finite number of such

theories)

general to enable proofs or disproofs of safety for

arbitrary protection systems.

Not surprisingly, we can show that

there is no decidable theory adequate for proving all
propositions about safety.

To bring these results closer to

practice, we also consider theories of protection for
systems which are bounded in size.

Here there are

computer

decidable

theories adequate for proving all propositions about safety.
However, proving safety intrinsically

requires enumerating

all

conceivable ways in which safety may be compromised, and hence
may use enormous amounts of time or space to reach a conclusion.
These results must be interpreted carefully.
the fundamental

They are about

limits of our abilities to demonstrate

protection systems are safe.

They do not rule out the

1

that

possibility

that we can construct individual protection

and prove that they are safe, or that we can find

practical

restrictions on protection systems which make safety
tractable.

systems

questions

Yet, these results do suggest that systems

without

severe restrictions on their operation will have safety
too expensive to answer.

questions

Thus we may be forced to shift our

concern from proving whether or not protection systems are
completely safe to proving whether breaches in security are
sufficiently costly to deter concerted

attacks.

Our results are obtained by applying known results
logic and complexity theory to questions of safety for
systems.

from
protection

The transferability of such results shows that

questions concerning safety are much more difficult to answer
than many might have

2.

believed.

Access control models of protection

systems

Protection systems encompass two kinds of policies and
mechanisms for enforcing them.

Access control policies

the right of access to objects in the system; flow

regulate

control

policies regulate the dissemination of information among the
objects of the system.

Since flow cannot occur without

access,

flow control problems are at least as difficult as access control
problems.

Accordingly, wo will

limit ourselves in this paper to

safety problems with access control
2

policies.

An access control policy specifies a set of objects, a set
of domains of access to these objects, a set of generic rights to
objects, and a niethqij of binding processes to domains.

An access

P.^.liH^i state is defined by a given distribution of generic
rights;

it can be envisaged as an access matrix whose

correspond to domains and columns to objects.
operating in domain

d

may use an object

x

rows

A process
in.a particular

way

only if a generic right enabling that action appears in the
access matrix at position

(d,x).

Some rights govern

processes may change the access control
A

when

state.

protection system comprises an access control

policy

together with an enforcement mechanism for the policy.
Enforcement mechanisms are judged by the criteria of security
precision.

A mechanism is secure if it disables all

prohibited by the policy;

operations

it is precise if it is secure

enables all operations permitted by the policy.

and

and

The number of

permitted operations disabled is a measure of a mechanism's
imprecision.

Whereas most systems may be able to tolerate

lack of precision,

few can tolerate a lack of

some

security.

The users of a system demand more than security or
precision.

They demand that both policy and mechanism be safe;

that is, no process should be able to acquire a right to an
object in violation of the declared intentions of the object's
owner.

An example of an unsafe, but secure, system is a

capability machine which imposes no restrictions on
3

capability

passing; this permits processes validly to acquire

capabilities

(i.e., rights) for objects without permission from the objects'
owners.

In contrast, a system that allows no sharing of objects

at all would be safe, but of little interest where shared
to data bases is important.

access

V.'e. are less interested in whether

enforcement m e c h a n i s m s are secure or precise than we are in
whether

the access control policy and its enforcement

mechanism

are safe.
Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullrnan [HRU76] showed that it is
undecidable whether a given, arbitrary protection system is safe.
In their model, the safety question is formulated by asking
a specific right
position

(d,x)?".

r

be placed in the access matrix at a specific
Should the answer to this question be

the system is unsafe since the right
to

d.

"Can

r

to

x

"yes",

can be "leaked''

The generality of their result is underscored by the

simplicity of their model of a protection system.
allows only a few primitive commands.

Their

model

Each command verifies

that

certain generic rights are present in the access matrix and, if
so, performs one or more elementrary operations that may
the state of the access matrix.

Elementary operations

creating or deleting objects or domains, and placing
rights in, or removing them from, the access matrix.

alter

allow

generic
The

undecidability of the safety question was established by showing
how to transform the halting problem for an arbitrary
m a c h i n e into a safety question; the construction

4

Turing

shows how the

sequence of configurations of an access control matrix

can

simulate the configurations of a Turing machine, with the generic
right of interest being placed in the access matrix position of
interest if and only if the Turing machine halts.
without proof their major
The_or^rri 2 . T h e

We state

results.

set of saTe protection systems is not

recursive .
Theorem 2_._2.
recursively

The set of unsafe protection systems is

enumerable.

Theorem 2.3.

When no new objects or domains of access can

be created, the set of safe protection systems is recursive
its decision problem is complete in polynomial

and

space.

The first theorem is equivalent to saying that it is
undecidable whether a given protection system is safe.

The

second theorem states that we can generate a list of all unsafe
systems;

this could be done by systematically enumerating

protection systems and all sequences of commands in each

all
system,

outputting the description of any system for which there is a
sequence of commands causing a leak.

We cannot, however, also

enumerate all safe systems, for a set is recursive if and only if
both it and its complement are recursively enumerable.

The third

theorem states that the safety question is decidable for systems
of bounded size, but that any algorithm which decides safety can
be expected to require enormous amounts of time. (1 )
5

Harrison, Huzzo, and Ullman also considered a highly
constrained class of systems permitting only

"mono-operational"

commands which perform at most one elementary operation.
unrealistically severe constraint only improves matters
•

The

se

This
slightly.

t of safe mono-operational

systems is
fp\
recursive; however, its decision problem is MP complete.
In other words, while the safety of a mono-operational
systen is decidable, proving its safety can be expected to
require exponential time in the worst case.
a proof of unsafety

And, though

is NP hard, such a proof is short,

finding

amounting

simply to a command sequence which generates a leak (and whose
length is bounded by a polynomial function of the size of the
system).

3.

Theories for funeral Pr°J:ict_ion systems
As a prelude to theories of protection we review the basic

concepts of theorem-proving systems.
recursive

L

is a

subset of the set of all possible strings over a given

finite alphabet; the members of
A deductive theory
of a set

A formal language

A

T

L

are called

sentences.

over a formal language

of axioms, where

A C L,

T

is defined

inductively
6

consists

and a finite set of rules

of inference, which are recursive relations over
theorems of

L

by:

L.

The set of

(a)

(b)

if

t

is an axiom (i.e., if

of

T;

and

if

t1,

..., t k

are theorems of

for some rule of inference
Thus every theorem
sequence
t^

t

<t^,..,,tn>

of

T

R,

T
then

then

t

is a theorem

and

<t1,...,tk,t>

t

is a theorem of

of sentences such that

t = t

Two theories

T
T

T'

have the same set of theorems.
the same axioms or rules of
A theory

T

We write

or is provable in
and

T.

and each

is either an axiom or follows from some subset of

is a theorem of

G R

has a proof which is a finite

by a rule of inference.
t

t 6 A),

T I- t

t^

to indicate

that

T.

are said to be equivalent if they
Equivalent theories need not have

inference.

is recursively axiomatizable

if it has (or is

equivalent to a theory with) a recursive set of axioms.

The set

of theorems of any recursively axiomatizable theory is
recursively enumerable: we can generate effectively all

finite

sequences of sentences, check each to see if it is a proof, and
enter

in the enumeration the final sentence of any sequence

which

is a proof.
A theory

T

is decidable if its theorems form a recursive

set.
Since the set of safe protection systems is not
enumerable,

recursively

it cannot be the set of theorems of a recursively

axiomatizable theory.

This means that the set of all safe
7

protection systems cannot be generated effectively by rules of
inference from a finite

(or even recursive) set of safe

(Note that this does not rule out the possibility of

systems.

effectively

generating smaller, but still interesting classes of safe
systems.)

This observation can be refined, as we proceed to do,

to establish further limitations on any recursively
theory of

protection.

Definition 3 • 1 •
language

axiomatizable

L

A representation of safety over a formal

is an effective map

systems to sentences of

Def ini tion 3^2.

from

protection

L.

We wish to interpret
the protection system

p —> t

t

as a statement of the safety of

p.
A theory

T

is adequate for proving

if and only if there is a representation

p —> t

safety

of safety

such

that
T

|- t

if and only if

p

is safe.

Analogs of the classical Church and Codel theorems for the
undecidability and incompleteness of formal theories of
arithmetic follow for formal theories of protection
Theorem 3.1.
must be

Any theory

T

systems.

adequate for proving

safety

undecidable.

This theorem follows from Theorem 2.1 by noting that, were

8

there an adequate decidable
protection system

p

Theorem 3 • 2.
T

T,

we could decide whether or not a

were safe by checking whether or not

There is no recursively axiomatizable

which is adequate for proving

safety.

This theorem follows from Theorems 2.1 and 2.2.
adequate and recursively
safety of

p

by enumerating simultaneously

appear in the list of theorems or

T

the theorems of

p

t

were

Theorem 3.2 shows that, given any recursively
and any representation

T

will

will appear in the list of

unsafe systems, enabling us to decide the safety of

T

If

axiomatizable, we could decide the

and the set of unsafe systems; eventually, either

theory

theory

p —> t

p.
axiomatizable

of safety, there

is

some protection system whose safety either is established
incorrectly by

T

or is not established when it should be.

This

result in itself is of limited interest for two reasons: it is
not constructive

(i.e., it does not show how to find such a

and, in practice, we may be willing to settle for

p);

inadequate

theories as long as they are sound, that is, as long as they do
not err by falsely establishing the safety of unsafe

systems.

The next theorem overcomes the first limitation, showing how to
construct a protection system
T

!- t ;

p

which is unsafe if and only if

the idea is to design the commands of

p

so that they

can simulate a Turing machine that "hunts" for a proof of the

9

safety of
proof,

p;

if and when a sequence of commands finds such a

it generates a leak.

such a protection system
be provable in

If the theory

p

T

must be safe but its safety

A theory

T

Theorem 3•3•

p

is safe whenever

Given any recursively axiomatizable theory

and any representation of safety in
protection system

p

for which

Furthermore, if

T

T,

T I- t p

T

one can construct a
if and only if

is sound, then

its safety is not provable in

p

p

is

must be safe, but

T.

The proof of Theorem 2 in [HRU76] shows how to

define, given an indexing
indexing

cannot

together with a representation

p - > t r of safety is sound if and only if
T !- t .
P

Proof.

then

T.

Pjr.C.iJliiiPJl 3^3 •

unsafe.

is sound,

of

^P^

[M^}

of Turing machines and an

Protection systems, a recursive

function

f

such that
(a)
Since

K^

T

halts

<=>

Pf(i)

unsafe.

is recursively axiomatizable and the map

computable, there is a recursive function
(b)

T

tp_

the Turing machine

M

g(i)

g(i)

halts;

simply enumerates all theorems of

if

Section

11.2], one can find effectively an index
Mj

p

i

is found.

y

halts

<z>

Ry the Recursion Theorem

M

g(f(j))
10

is

such that

halting

(c)

t

<->

g

p -> t

halts.

j

T,

[Rogers,
such that

Combining

(a), (b), and (c) , and letting

(d)

T

tp

<=>

MR(fCj))

<=>

Mj

<=>

p =

p =

p

f(j)>

we get

halts

halts
p

f(j)

is

unsa

fei

as was to be shown.
Now suppose that
theorem of

T

lest

unsafe by (d).

T
p

Hence,

is sound.

Then

t

be simultaneously
T 1/ t , and

p

cannot be a

safe by soundness and
is safe by (d).

[]

The unprovability of the safety of a protection system
in a given sound theory
unprovable
adding

T

does not imply

in every theory.

t

to its axioms.

T'.

safety is

We can, for example, augment
However, Theorem 3-3 states

there will exist another safe
the new theory

p's

p'

p

T

that

whose safety is unprovable

In other words, this abstract view

by

in

shows

that systems for proving safety are necessarily incomplete: no
single effective deduction system can be used to settle all
questions of

safety.

The process of extending protection theories to encompass
systems not provably safe in previous theories creates a
progression of ever stronger deductive theories.
stronger

With the

theories, proofs of safety can be shortened by

amounts relative to the weaker theories.

(Godel

unbounded

[G6del3&]

discussed this phenomenon in logic and Plum [Blumfi?] discussed
similar phenomena in computational

11

complexity.)

T h e o r e n s 3.2 and 3 . 3

force us to settle for attempting

construct sound, but necessarily
protection.

inadequate, theories of

What goals might we seek to achieve in constructing

such a theory
nontrivial;

T?

At the least, we would want

uninteresting.

T,

when added to the

If this were so, then we could at least

was of any use in attempting

p

beginning a search

p's

for a proof or disproof of

next theorem shows that this hope cannot be
Theorem 3.^.

=

If

T

{ p:

X

protection system

safe.

before
safety.

The

fulfilled.

T !— t

or

p

T,

T

the set

unsafe

}

recursive.

P_roof.

check

safety

Given any recursively axiomatizable theory

and any sound representation of safety in
X

determine

to establish the

or unsafety of a particular protection system

is not

theorems

enumerable set of unsafe systems, would form a

recursive set.
T

to be

We might also hope that the

systems whose safety was provable in

whether

T

theories that were sound because they had no

would be singularly

recursively

to

to see if

were recursive, then the safety of a
p

p

could be decided as follows.
is in

X.

First, we

If it is not, then it must be

If it is, then we enumerate simultaneously

the theorems of

and the unsafe systems, stopping when we eventually

either a proof of
[]

p's

safety or the fact that

12

p

find

is unsafe.

^•

for

protection systems of bounded

Real systems are finite.

size

Some systems are designed for a

fixed maximum number of users; others are designed to be
extendable to any number of users, but at any given time are
configured to handle only a given finite

number.

If we consider finite systems in which the number of objects
and domains of access cannot grow beyond the number present in
the initial configuration, then the safety question

becomes

decidable, although any decision procedure is likely to require
enormous amounts of time (cf. Theorem 2.3).

This doubtless

out practical mechanical safety tests for these

rules

systems.

However, this does not rule out successful safety

tests

constructed by hand: ingenious or lucky people might always be
able to find proofs faster than any mechanical method.
now that even this hope is

We show

ill-founded.

Although we can always obtain shorter safety proofs by
choosing a proof system in which the rules of inference are more
complicated, it makes little sense to employ proof systems whose
rules are so complex that it is difficult to decide whether
alleged proof is valid.

an

We shall regard a logical system as

"reasonable 1 " if we can decide whether a given string of symbols
constitutes a proof in the system in time which is a polynomial
function of the string's length.
reasonable by this definition.

Practical logical systems
We show now that,

13

are

corresponding

to any reasonable.proof

system, there are protection

systems

which are bounded in size, but whose safety proofs or
cannot be expected to have lengths bounded by
functions of the size of the protection
Theorem H.1.

disproofs

polynomial

systems.

For the class of protection systems in which

the number of objects and domains of access is bounded,
(or unsafety)

safety

is polynomial verifiable by some reasonable

system if and only if

PSPACE = NP,

logical

that is, if and only if any

problem solvable in polynomial space is solvable in
nondeterministic

polynomial

time.

(?)

Ry Theorem 2.3, the safety and unsafety
problems
if

for systems of bounded size are both in PSPACE.

PSPACE z >1P,

Hence,

then there would be MP-time Turing machines to

decide both safety and unsafety.

Given such machines, we could

define a reasonable logical system in which safety and unsafety
were polynomial verifiable: the ''axioms" would correspond to the
initial configurations of the Turing m a c h i n e s and the "rules of
inference" to the transition tables for the machines.
(=>)

Also by Theorem 2.3, any problem in PSPACF is

reducible to a question concerning the safety (or unsafety) of a
protection system whose size is bounded by a polynomial

function

of the size of the original problem.

(or

Mow if the safety

unsafety) of protection systems with bounded size were
verifiable, we could decide safety

1 'I

(or unsafety)

polynomial

in NP-time by

first '"guessing" a proof and then verifying that it was a proof
(performing

both tasks in polynomial time).

By Theorem 2.3,

could then solve any problem in PSPACE in NP-time, showing
PSPACE = NP.

we
that

[]

Since the above result applies equally to proofs of safety
and unsafety, one must expect that there are systems for which
will be just as difficult and costly to penetrate the system as
to prove that it can (or cannot) be done.
systems, however, the situation is quite
Theorem
polynomial
Proof.

.2.

In mono-operational
different.

The unsafety of mono-operational

systems is

verifiable.
This result follows from Theorem 2.H, which

that the unsafety question for mono-operational
solvable in NP-time.

systems is

Alternatively, we simply observe that to

demonstrate unsafety, one need only exhibit a command
leading to a leak.

shows

From

sequence

[MRU76] we know that there are

short

unsafe command sequences if any exist at all: an upper bound on
the length of such sequences is
number of generic rights,
and

n

m

the number of objects.

g(m+1)(n+1),

where

g

is the

the number of domains of access,
Thus an unsafe sequence (if it

exists) has a length bounded by a simple polynomial function of
the system size .

[]
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By Theorems 2.3 and ^.2, proofs of unsafety for m o n o operational

systems are short, but the time to find the proofs

cannot be guaranteed to be short; at the worst we might have to
enumerate each of the sequences of length
could produce a leak.

•

that

However, while proofs of unsafety

short for mono-operational
Theorem

g(m+1)(n+1)

are

systems, proofs of safety are not.

For mono-operational

systems, safety

is

polynomial verifiable if and only if NP is closed under
complement.^ ^
Proof.

If MP were closed under complement, then

would be in MP because unsafety

is in MP by Theorerr 4.2.

there would be a nondeterministic Turing machine for
safety in polynomial
polynomial

safety
Thus

checking

time, which would demonstrate that safety

is

verifiable.

Conversely, suppose that safety were polynomial

verifiable.

We could then construct a nondeterministic Turing machine

which

would guess a proof of safety and then check it in polynomial
time; hence safety would be in NP.
Theorem

But unsafety

is in NP by

and if any NP complete problem has its complement

MP, then NP is closed under complement [Kar75].
These results imply

in

[]

that system penetrators have a slight

adv,-mtage when challenging mono-operations systems: any

system

that can bp penctrntdl lias n short command sequence for doing so.
However, it may still take enormous amounts of time to find such
16

sequences, as no s y s t e m a t i c method of finding an unsafe

command

sequence in p o l y n o m i a l - b o u n d e d time is likely to be found.

5.

I ov l ar _ds safe protection
Our primary

systems

interest in studying the provability of safety

questions for protection systems is metaphysical:
the fundamental

understanding

limits of our abilities to build provably

computer systems.

The results confirm widely-held

that there is no hope of proving the security of
systems in any systematic or economical fashion.

secure

suspicions

arbitrary
Moreover,

suggest that practical restrictions leading to tractable

they

proofs

of safety may be hard to find.
Our results for unbounded systems began from earlier
that showed how to encode an arbitrary Turing
configurations

results

machine's

into the states of an access control

matrix,

leading thereby to the conclusion that proving a system safe is
equivalent to solving

the halting problem.

We extended

this

result to demonstrate that any fixed logical system is inadequate
for establishing

the safety of all protection systems: there will

always be a protection system whose safety is neither
nor d i s p r o v a b l e .

provable

We outlined the construction of such a system.

When attention

is shifted to the protection systems of

bounded size we are likely to encounter

17

in practice, the earlier

questions become decidable,

but intractably so.

The set of safe

protection systems of bounded size is decidable now, but
decision problem is complete among problems solvable

its

in

polynomial space, which means that any decision procedure
likely to require an amount of time at least exponential
size of the protection system.

in the-

It also means that safety

or disproofs are likely to be exponentially
size of the protection

is

proofs

long'(again in the

system).

As an illustration.of restrictions within which proofs

could

be tractable, we considered protection systems with monooperational commands-

For these systems, the length of a proof

of unsafety can be bounded by the product of the dimensions
the protection system; but proofs of safety are still
Moreover,

though a proof of unsafety may be short,

likely to require at least exponential

of

long.

finding it is

time.

In another study, Harrison and Ruzzo [HaR76]

considered

other protection systems whose commands are "monotone'" , i.e.
whose commands never delete any domains, objects, or
rights from the system.

Since monotone systems are

generic
powerful

enough to simulate Turing machines, all the above results

apply

to them as well.
These results support skepticism toward proving

systems

safe, for there is no single, systematic, general approach
establishing

the safety or unsafety of arbitrary

IP,

protection

to

systems.

Hence we are forced to deal with approaches that are

less general, or that attack the problem from a different
of view.

point

Following are several possible approaches to the

problem,
(1)

Despite the undecidability

and intractability

results,

we can still try to prove particular protection systems
After all, the incompleteness,

undecidabi1ity, and

safe.

intractability

results in number theory have not stopped m a t h e m a t i c i a n s

from

trying to prove interesting theorems, and so our results

for

protection systems should not stop computer scientists
trying to prove the safety of interesting protection

from

systems.

Our results merely stand as a warning that proving systems

safe

is not likely to be easy.
(2)

In this respect,

techniques

it would be be useful to develop

for proving the safety of sufficiently

protection systems.
investigated

simple

For example, Lipton and Snyder

[L1ST7]

a class of systems which possesses a linear-time

algorithm for deciding safety.

On the other hand, the same

authors [LiS78] studied another class of protection systems
safety question
systems
though
prove

is equivalent to a problem about vector

addition

(which seems to require at least exponential.time
it is decidable).

Further study of such classes

Rather

than trying to guarantee the safety of a

19

even

should

fruitful.
(3)

whose

protection system, which might be expensive, we might
seek to give shorter demonstrations

that the system is

safe" or "safe beyond a reasonable doubt".

"probably

One possible

night be to construct theories of protection which
though with very low probability,

instead

approach

occasionally,

produced a "proof" that an

unsafe system was safe.
(4)

Finally, recognizing the well-known

fact that

certain

access paths, known as "covert channels", may well be too
expensive

to eliminate

[Lip75], we might concentrate on trying

prove that any way of compromising
likewise be too expensive.

to

a given protection system must

Given this approach, the question of

central importance would not be whether we could prove that a
system is safe, but whether we could prove that finding a breach
of security

is, say, NP-hard or even harder.

20

Footnotes
^^More

precisely, it was shown that the safety problem for

systems can.be solved in polynomial time
a polynomial

these

(time proportional

to

function of the length of the description of the

system) if and only if

PSPACE = P,

i.e. if and only if any

problem which can be solved in polynomial space can also be
solved in polynomial
time and space
PSPACE i P;

time.

Although the relationship

is not well understood, it is believed

between
that

in fact, it is believed that exponential time

required for such

is

problems.

(2)
The UP complete problems consititute a large class of
problems, one of which is the well-known traveling
problem;

salesman

if any one of these problems could he solved

in

polynomial time, then every problem in the class could be
solved in polynomial

time.

However, it is widely

that exponential time is required to solve these

believed
problems.

See [AHU75] for a more thorough treatment of MP complete
problems.
^ ^ P S P A C E is the class of all problems which can be solved in
polynomial space.

It is known that any problem which can be

solved nondeterministically

in polynomial space is in PSPACE,

but it is widely believed that
( 2| )
It is considered unlikely

PSPACE t MP.

that NP is closed under

j
21

complement.
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